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ASSESSING THE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
LABOUR LAW SYSTEMS: A THEORETICAL 
REAPPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS OF NEW TIME SERIES 
DATA 
 




The issue of the economic impact of labour laws has been the focus of 
intense inquiry and debate at transnational level since the early 1990s, 
with the publication of the OECD’s Jobs Study (OECD, 1994), and before 
that played a significant role in the formation of public policy in certain 
countries, most notably America and Britain, which underwent a process 
of labour market deregulation in the course of the 1980s.  Throughout this 
period the predominant view within economic theory has been to see 
labour law rules as interferences with the operation of markets, and as 
therefore requiring justification on market-failure or related grounds if 
they are not to result in inefficiencies or distortions.  Yet it has proved 
surprisingly difficult to demonstrate empirically that labour law rules have 
the negative effects contended for them (see Baker et al., 2005).  One 
possible reason for this is that labour law rules have many beneficial 
economic impacts which may operate alongside, or offset the effects of, 
their negative ones: these include overcoming the wage- and employment-
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depressing effects of employer monopsony (Card and Krueger, 1997; 
Manning, 2005), encouraging firms to use labour more productively 
(Rubery and Edwards, 2003), stabilizing employment over the economic 
cycle (Amable, Demmou and Gatti, 2007), and promoting a cooperative 
industrial relations climate with knock-on effects in terms of the reduction 
of unemployment (Feldmann, 2008).  Labour law is also highly effective 
in promoting social goals such as the reduction of wage inequality 
(Freeman, 2005).   
 
Alongside this empirical reassessment, there has been a growing interest in 
theories which view labour law, together with other forms of market 
regulation, in comparative political economy terms.  In this approach, 
labour laws are seen as the outcome of macroeconomic conditions, 
interest-group configurations and legal-political structures which are 
embedded in particular national contexts.  Labour laws are therefore, in 
part at least, endogenous to the wider economic and political systems 
within they operate.  An implication of this approach is that legal rules do 
not operate in a straightforwardly instrumental way to reshape economic 
outcomes.   This is for several reasons.  Formal legal rules are not so much 
external forces reshaping markets according to political will, as they are 
codified conventions which to a certain extent reflect and embody existing 
market practices.  The impacts of changes in the formal law are mediated 
through self-regulatory mechanisms and social norms of varying degrees 
of formality, introducing an element of unpredictability into their 
operation.  In addition, legal rules do not operate upon exchange 
relationships in isolation, but in conjunction with other, interlocking 
elements within the regulatory framework.  In particular, labour 
regulations interact with complementary mechanisms such as corporate 
governance rules and product market regulation (Amable, 2004).  For 
these various reasons, then, changes to labour law institutions may not 
have the effects predicted for them by orthodox supply-and-demand 
models. 
 
A related feature of recent analyses has been the attempt to achieve a 
better empirical understanding of legal systems.  The legal origins school 
has focused attention on the role which legal infrastructure – broadly 
speaking, the institutional framework for rule-making in a given society – 
plays in shaping the substantive content of regulation (La Porta et al., 
2008).  To study this effect, novel empirical methods, involving the 




construction of indices attempting to measure the intensity of legal 
regulation across national regimes, have been developed.  The strong-form 
legal origins hypothesis, which claims to identify a sharp bifurcation of 
legal systems along the lines of the common law/civil law divide, remains 
highly contentious both theoretically and empirically (see Ahlering and 
Deakin, 2007).  However, the idea that legal institutions may be 
responsible, in part at least, for the persistence of cross-national diversity 
in approaches to economic regulation, is in the process of gaining wider 
acceptance, and thereby opening up new lines of analysis. 
 
In this paper we seek to advance the debate over the economic impact of 
labour law in two ways.  We aim firstly to show how re-theorising law as 
an embedded institutional phenomenon, at least partly endogenous to the 
process of economic development within market economies, results in 
new perspectives on the economic impact of labour law rules.  Section 2 
reviews the relevant theories.  Then we address the empirical question of 
how changes to labour law impact on the economy by introducing new 
evidence in the form of time-series data on legal change.  To this end, 
section 3 discusses the methodology of index construction as it applies to 
labour law and other forms of legal regulation of the business enterprise 
(company and insolvency law), and presents first results from a newly 
created dataset examining changes in labour law in three major European 
countries, as well as the US, since the early 1970s.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF LABOUR LAW RULES 
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORCES SHAPING LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
 
The standard economic critique of labour regulation takes the view that 
labour law rules operate as external interferences with market relations.  
This is to assume not simply that the market operates, in the absence of 
legal regulation, in a self-equilibrating way, correcting itself in response to 
temporary distortions or imperfections; it is also to assume that legal 
institutions are exogenous to the processes of market formation and 
operation.  Labour law rules, it is suggested, originate largely in the rent-
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seeking activities of organized interest groups.  Rent-seeking reduces 
efficiency by channeling resources away from wealth-creation to 
redistribution.  More generally, while labour law rules may be seen as 
responses to market failures which include monopsony effects and 
asymmetries of information, regulatory failure is also a strong possibility, 
with the result that labour laws are rarely matched in a precise way to the 
inefficiencies they purport to address; they are just as likely to introduce 
fresh distortions. 
 
This view has been challenged by a variety of approaches in which labour 
market institutions, including labour laws and regulations, are seen as 
endogenously generated by a combination of economic and political forces 
operating at the level of nation states (and, to a lesser degree, at sub-
national regional level and at transnational level).  The starting point is to 
understand institutions as devices for coordinating the expectations of 
actors.  As responses to market failures of various kinds, they emerge out 
of particular market settings.  Norms of varying degrees of formality 
embody or encode solutions to coordination problems which have stood 
the test of time.  They are not distributionally neutral; they involve 
compromises on rent-sharing which, if they endure, can provide the basis 
for long-term contractual cooperation.  The basic form of the employment 
contract in developed market economies is an illustration of this: the 
contract reserves powers of coordination and control to the employer in 
return for access to mechanisms of insurance and income smoothing 
which protect the worker against risks inherent in employee status, 
including unemployment.  The ‘contract’ in this sense refers both to a 
convention which is widely, if sometimes loosely, understood by market 
actors, and also to a formal legal institution which is ‘script-coded’ within 
the discourse of the legal system (Carvalho and Deakin, 2008).  The legal 
system associates ‘employment’ with a certain normative structure, which 
is derived, in part, from practices which have grown up around contracting 
in labour markets, and in part reflects the internal conceptual or dogmatic 
language used by the law to describe those relationships.  The law does 
not simply impose normative expectations of behaviour from outside; it 
also, to some degree, crystallizes social practices which are drawn from 
the experiences of market actors (Deakin, 2003). 
 
The core institutions of labour law – including collective bargaining laws, 
unemployment insurance schemes, minimum wage laws, and employment 




protection legislation – are based to a large degree on models first 
developed at the level of particular industries or firms, or in certain 
localities.  State-based unemployment compensation systems at the turn of 
the twentieth century drew on the practice of northern European cities and 
localities (one particularly influential model was known as the ‘Ghent 
system’) and on trade unions’ schemes for mutual insurance.  The 
statutory model of codetermination in Germany has multiple origins which 
include the paternalistic practices of large firms as well as workers’ 
attempts at self-organisation in the early decades of the twentieth century.  
The mid-twentieth century arrival of unfair dismissal legislation took place 
against the widespread use of structured internal labour markets and 
bureaucratic management techniques in large firms. In the European 
context, each of these legislative initiatives has been supported, at one 
point or another, by both management and labour (although not always by 
both at the same time), and in some cases they were introduced by centre-
right parties.  Labour legislation cannot be explained as serving the 
interests of organized labour alone. 
 
The legal system, as it is able to mobilise the monopoly of enforcement 
which an effective state possesses, extends and standardizes practices 
which are perceived to have been successful at firm or industry level.  The 
standardisation of social practices through law is a technique used to 
reduce the transaction costs which would otherwise be involved in market 
actors searching for solutions from scratch each time a coordination failure 
arose (Warneryd, 1998).  It also helps to reduce the threat of mutual 
defection in prisoner’s-dilemma type situations, where individually 
rational behaviour would lead to a net welfare loss (Hyde, 2006).  
However, no legal rule operates on the basis of perfect enforcement.  
Legal sanctions can alter incentives, but the successful implementation of 
legal rules necessarily depends to some degree on the existence of the 
understandings of market actors, beyond the legal system itself (Aoki, 
2001).  Bargaining takes place not on the assumption of the complete legal 
enforcement of contracts, but ‘in the shadow of legal rules’ which may be 
triggered in an endgame situation, but which most of the time remain in 
the background.   
 
Labour laws, like any other form of market regulation, are not made in a 
vacuum, and nor are they the result of a purely disinterested and 
technocratic process of rule formation, although there is a role for 
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expertise in their drafting.  Because they have (and are meant to have) 
redistributive consequences, they reflect the power and influence of 
interest groups and their capacity to mobilize the political process to their 
ends.  Solutions which ‘work’ for some groups will normally involve 
losses for others, and will be resisted even if they give rise to net welfare 
gains at a societal level.  However, the process of rule formation is not just 
an expression of the relative bargaining positions of the different interest 
groups.  Because legal and political institutions are relatively slow to 
change in relation to the macroeconomic and political cycles, they may 
have an independent role in framing the interactions of the groups; in 
particular, they may alter their composition and shape the coalitions they 
make.  More generally, the relative rigidity and longevity of institutions 
implies a role for complementarities of various kinds which then generate 
cross-national diversity of practice.   
 
An example of this, which has been extensively studied in the comparative 
political economy literature, is the influence of voting systems.  A link has 
been suggested between proportional representation and interest group 
support for a mix of policies involving a high level of employment 
protection, on the one hand, and legal support for the concentration of 
share ownership, on the other.  This is said to be because proportional 
representation encourages coalition building between interest groups 
representing labour market insiders and corporate blockholders.  It is 
argued that in majority-voting systems, by contrast, the most likely 
interest-group alignments are those which favour a conjunction of 
financial market liberalization and labour market flexibility (Gourevitch 
and Shinn, 2005; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).   
 
Macroeconomic conditions may play a role in shaping institutions.  For 
example, high and persistent unemployment may be a factor in rising 
union density, in systems, such as the Nordic ones, where unions rather 
than the state play the main role in providing social insurance (Checchi 
and Nunziata, 2007); in systems where unions’ main function is wage 
determination, such as Britain, union membership and militancy fluctuate 
according to the strength or weakness of inflationary pressures.  Because 
union strength has been one of the factors affecting the content of labour 
law in Britain, at least during most of the twentieth century, there is a 
relationship between the inflationary cycle and the trajectory of labour 
legislation (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: ch. 4).  If union membership and 




activity on the one hand and labour legislation on the other are 
endogenous to the macroeconomic cycle, it becomes difficult to 
disentangle the direction of causation: do institutional changes have 
economic impacts or are they themselves the consequence of 
macroeconomic shifts (Rodrik, 2005)? 
 
Some accounts see present-day institutional configurations as having deep 
historical roots.  Iversen and Soskice (2007) argue that the divergence 
between liberal market and coordinated market systems can be traced back 
to the period, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the 
modern institutions of representative democracy were being formed in 
western Europe.  Systems which opted for proportional representation 
(PR) ended up favouring coalition building and consensus-based policies, 
which resulted in a bias towards redistribution, wage compression, 
economic coordination and strong welfare states.  By contrast, 
majoritarian voting systems had a centre-right bias, which over time 
resulted in a tendency towards limited redistribution, minimal welfare 
states, and a liberal economic framework.  In coordinated market systems, 
employers accepted unemployment compensation systems based on high 
replacement rates and, in time, the complementary institution of 
employment protection legislation, in order to encourage workers to invest 
in firm-specific skills.  In liberal market systems, which placed les 
emphasis on firm-specific skill formation, neither employers nor workers 
had strong incentives to press for strict employment protection or high 
replacement rates in unemployment insurance.  Why then did certain 
systems adopt PR at the critical point of institutional development at the 
end of the nineteenth century?  Iversen and Soskice’s detailed argument on 
this point is that in the Nordic and northern European systems, 
industrialization took place in a context where economic coordination 
through guild systems and localized forms of employer and worker 
solidarity remained strong, and where a proto-corporatist framework of 
political representation of organized economic groupings or, as they were 
traditionally known, ‘estates’, continued to operate.  In Britain, by 
contrast, guild systems were largely swept away in the early nineteenth 
century, and associational interests did not have direct representation in 
the political process.  The upshot is that ‘the advanced countries with 
strong welfare states today are those in which economies were locally 
coordinated a century and a half ago; and whose state tradition was one of 
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functional representation and limited autonomy of government to different 
interests’ (Iversen and Soskice, 2007: 37). 
 
B.  THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A SOURCE OF PATH-DEPENDENCE AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL DIVERSITY: THE LEGAL ORIGIN HYPOTHESIS 
 
Legal origins theory offers another long-run historical explanation for 
diversity, but sees the legal system itself, and more precisely legal 
infrastructure or the framework for law-making, as a principal cause of the 
persistence of national patterns of regulation and for divergence at a cross-
national level.   Common law systems, because of the predominant role 
they are thought to accord to judge-made law over that of legislation as a 
form of rule-making, are said to have a bias in favour of market-creating 
rules and a laissez-faire approach to the governance of the business 
enterprise.  In civil law systems, reliance on codes and general statutory 
restatements of legal principle is seen as privileging a regulatory style 
which results in redistribution at the expense of wealth creation, and is 
predisposed towards market regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002).  Two 
‘channels’ are identified as the links between legal infrastructure and the 
substantive content of rules: an ‘adaptability’ channel, according to which 
the common law is inherently more adaptive than the civil law in the sense 
of being responsive to a changing economic environment, as a 
consequence of the priority accorded to judicial rule making (Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2003), and a ‘political’ channel, according to 
which the civil law, because of its regulatory bias, offers greater 
opportunities for (inefficient) rent-seeking (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 
Legal origin theory sees a major role for the transplantation of legal norms 
as a source of path dependence in institutions.  Laws can be transplanted 
from outside the national system concerned, by virtue of the borrowing or 
copying of legislative models, compliance with international standards, or 
through the imposition of laws following conquest or colonialisation.  The 
legal origin approach sees transplantation as an external influence on legal 
development, on the basis that nearly all systems in the world have drawn 
the their basic legal infrastructure from one of the original common law or 
civil law models.  These parent systems aside, the legal system can 




therefore be understood as having an exogenous impact on long-run 
institutional development and economic growth.    
 
One objection to the legal origin approach is that it takes an overly 
mechanical view of the process of legal transplantation.  It ignores the 
high degree of borrowing that has gone on between systems, even before 
the adoption of the principal private law codes in the civil law at the start 
of the nineteenth century; all national systems are, to some degree, hybrids 
which contain elements of the regulatory styles associated with the 
common law and civil law families (Siems, 2007).  It also overlooks 
numerous example of the ‘endogenisation’ of legal rules which occurs as 
part of the borrowing process; legal models which originate in a given 
system can be adapted to local conditions.  The adaptation process is never 
complete but nor is complete rejection the norm; it may be most accurate 
to speak not of ‘transplants’ but of ‘irritants’ or catalysts which may well 
trigger unexpected effects in the host systems, but which are rarely 
without consequences of some kind (Teubner, 2001). 
 
A further difficulty with the legal origins approach is the somewhat over-
simplified account it gives of the common law/civil law divide (see 
Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  While it is the case that civilian systems do 
not formally recognize case law as a source of law in the same sense as the 
provisions of the private law codes, there is a long record of judicial 
innovation, not least in those areas of the law which touch directly on the 
business enterprise (company and labour law), in civil law systems; 
conversely, a great deal of modern labour law and company law in 
common law systems such as the United Kingdom and the United States is 
statutory in origin.  The idea that judge-made law is a ‘spontaneous order’ 
with adaptive properties, while the private law codes are constructivist 
restatements of the law which have restricted its development, draws far 
too strong a contrast between different regulatory styles.  In practice, case 
law is subject to litigation strategies which incorporate pressure group 
activity in much the same way that legislation is (Galanter, 1974); the 
difference is one of degree, if it exists at all.  In all systems, rules of 
legislative origin (including those originating in the private law codes, 
which are perhaps not accurately characterised as statutes at all) are 
subject to reinterpretation and ex-post adjustment by the courts in the light 
of the disputes that come before them. 
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Having said that, there are good grounds for thinking that legal origins 
theory has identified in the legal system a potentially important source of 
path dependence in the evolution of market economies.  In a weak-form 
version of the legal origin hypothesis, regulatory styles across national 
systems could have an impact on the content of substantive rules and, as a 
result, on economic outcomes, even if the questionable claim that the 
common law is inherently more likely to generate efficient results than the 
civil law is rejected.  Systems theory or autopoiesis is useful here in 
pointing out the nature of, and limits to, the autonomy of the legal system 
with regard to the economy and to the political system (Teubner, 1993; 
Luhmann, 2006).  The legal system, thanks to the development of its own 
distinctive discourse and processes, evolves according to an internal 
dynamic, and is not simply a cipher for broader economic or political 
forces.  ‘Legal culture’, understood as the ingrained and often informal 
processes, concepts and understandings which aid the interpretation and 
application of legal rules, is a powerful force for preserving the 
distinctiveness of the legal order (Legrand, 1999; for examples in the 
labour law context, see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007).  To speak of legal 
autonomy is not to imply that the legal system is unaffected by its wider 
context.  Legal norms in an area such as labour law change over time in 
response, in part, to selective pressures coming from the external 
environment, and can be expected to influence the economic and political 
systems in their turn.  The relationship between the legal and economic 
systems is recursive and iterative, rather than linear, but they are not 
completely sealed off from each other’s influence.  Rather than speaking 
of the legal system as entirely endogenous to the economy, it may be more 
accurate to invoke the idea of the coevolution of economy and law.  
Systemic coevolution ensures that, while the fit between systems is never 
exact, some degree of correspondence or congruence can be expected to 
take place over time, and for institutional complementarities to emerge.  
Thus the legal system may act as an institutional ‘carrier of history’, 
giving expression to conjunctions between political and economic 
institutions of the kind which the comparative political economy literature 
sees as a reason for the persistence of cross-national diversity (Ahlering 
and Deakin, 2007).   
 




C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VIEWING LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AS ENDOGENOUS  
 
How should we assess the debate about the economic impact of labour law 
in the light of these observations?  We are moving away from a position 
which sees labour law as an exogenous interference with market relations, 
to one in which labour law rules are understood as evolved responses to 
coordination failures of various kinds.  The evolution of labour law is a 
result, in the first instance, of the internal dynamics of the legal order, but 
is also broadly reflective of social practices in the areas which the law 
seeks to regulate.  By virtue of its separation from the economy and the 
political realm, the law is never a perfect match for market conditions; it 
would only be completely adaptive if it ceased to be autonomous in any 
way.  The separation of formal law from other social subsystems, while it 
carries a cost in terms of disjunctions between law and the economy, is 
also the precondition for the law’s capacity to reproduce itself and thereby 
ensure the continuity of the collective learning which is embodied in legal 
norms (Carvalho and Deakin, 2008). 
 
How far, then, can the law be used as an instrument of economic change?  
Here it is instructive to reflect on Teubner’s striking observation that when 
the law imposes a wage freeze or (to use a more contemporary example, 
perhaps) enacts an unfair dismissal law, all that has happened, in one 
sense, is that there has been an internal communication from one part of 
the legal system to another (Teubner, 1993).  What this means is that the 
legislative text itself, assuming it has been legitimately adopted, is 
recognized by the legal system as having certain effects for court 
judgments and rulings and associated mechanisms of legal enforcement.  
For example, the legislative articulation of a standard of fairness in 
dismissal has immediate repercussions for the underlying private law 
norms which, in most systems, impose few such formal constraints on the 
employer’s power of termination.  However, this says nothing about the 
implementation of the rule at the level of economic relationships.  Such 
implementation depends on the capacity of the economic system to 
receive, de-code and implement the legal text, a process which goes on 
beyond the boundaries of the legal system.  In practice, employment 
protection laws may be enforced and implemented by a variety of means: 
the activities of labour inspectors, human resources managers and trade 
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union officials; litigation and other forms of dispute resolution; the 
adoption of codes of practice building on the law; the incorporation of 
legal norms into standard-form contracts at firm and industry level; and so 
on.  The widespread acceptance of a legal rule may also come to depend 
on a general understanding on the part of market actors, without the need 
for specific enforcement mechanisms.  However, only those legal norms 
which have an especially close connection to social practice and are based 
on a general consensus are likely to have this self-enforcing character.  
Many labour law rules, including unfair dismissal statutes, have 
distributive consequences which make them highly disputed in practice. 
 
The effects of labour law depend, then, on the existence of processes 
beyond the legal system, referred to in systems theory as mechanisms of 
‘structural coupling’, which serve to translate them, however imperfectly, 
into practice (Rogowski and Wilthagen, 1994).  Under these 
circumstances, few a priori assumptions can be made about the impact of 
labour law rules.  The impact of changes in formal rules at national level 
will depend on a range of factors in play at the level of the relevant 
industry or firm.  At the micro level, the translation process may well be 
most problematic in precisely those sectors or enterprises which did not 
previously observe the social norm or practice from which part of the 
content of the rule is derived.   The contentious application of unfair 
dismissal laws, which gave expression to the employment practices of 
large, bureaucratically-organised enterprises, to smaller firms and 
casualised forms of work illustrates the point.  At a macro level, the 
impact of a labour law reform will depend on the knock-on effects upon 
complementary institutions.  These are not confined to institutions of the 
labour market alone, but can extend to mechanisms which are closely 
linked to labour law, such as product market regulation, tort law, 
commercial contract law and, above all, company law and corporate 
governance (Barker and Rueda, 2007).   
 
Is this essential indeterminacy of labour law one possible reason for the 
failure of empirical analyses to find a clear and consistent set of findings 
concerning its economic impacts?  The predicted effects of employment 
protection legislation (‘EPL’) include higher unemployment as firms are 
deterred from hiring, and a reduction in productivity thanks to the slowing 
down of the movement of labour from less productive to more productive 
firms (Saint-Paul, 1997).  On the other hand, EPL may reduce 




unemployment by making it more costly for employers to dismiss workers 
in a downturn, and by providing incentives for training as a substitute for 
redundancies it may enhance productivity (Koeniger, 2005).  Empirically, 
it has proved very hard to establish which of these effects predominates.  
Econometric studies based on national-level data have not been able to 
establish a clear relationship between EPL and employment.  There is 
some evidence that EPL stabilizes employment but also increases the 
duration of unemployment; evidence that it slows down the inter-firm 
movement of labour in response to demand and wage shocks is weak (see 
Bertola, 2008).   
 
A nuanced view of the effects of labour law should take into account its 
selective impact; because the law is mostly concerned with extending and 
standardizing existing practices, legal interventions will have most impact 
on those firms and sectors which do not already follow the practices in 
question, or in which the workers most directly affected by the legal 
measure in question are concentrated.  Taking this approach, Bassanini 
and Venn (2007), in an analysis of 18 OECD countries, report a negative 
relationship between EPL and labour productivity growth when ‘EPL-
binding’ industries are compared to non-binding industries.  They define 
an EPL-binding industry as one in which firms have a higher propensity to 
dismiss workers in a downturn.  On the other hand, they find a positive 
impact of minimum wage laws on productivity in low-paying sectors, as 
well as a positive effect of parental leave laws in female-dominated 
industries.   
 
A growing number of studies are looking at possible complementarities 
between labour law rules and alternative institutions including product 
market regulation and corporate governance rules (Boeri, Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2000; Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2003; Amable, Ersnt and Polombarini, 2005; Amable, Demmou and Gatti, 
2007).  Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007), reviewing aggregate national 
data from OECD countries, find evidence to suggest that product market 
regulation and EPL are substitutes: deregulation in product markets 
produces higher growth only in conjunction with the preservation of a high 
level of EPL.  Gatti (2008), conversely, finds that high EPL may be 
complementary to ownership concentration of the kind associated with a 
coordinated market approach to corporate governance: high ownership 
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concentration has a positive impact on labour productivity when combined 
with high EPL. 
 
This type of research, then, suggests that the impact of labour law changes 
must be assessed by taking into account both the uneven impacts which 
labour regulation has on firms and industries, and the way in which labour 
law interacts with other elements in the regulatory framework, with time-
series evidence being essential in both cases if dynamic effects are to be 
captured.  When this is done, the economic effects of labour laws become 
certainly more complex but also, in many instances, more positive in terms 
of their implications for productivity and growth, than the standard 
approach implies.   
 
For all that, the sway of the orthodox model remains strong, particularly at 
the level of policy making.  In 2003 the IMF called for the deregulation of 
European labour markets, arguing that reforms intended to bring European 
labour laws into lines with those of the US would cut unemployment by 
over a third, with an even bigger reduction if they were combined with 
product market deregulation (IMF, 2003).  The OECD, notwithstanding 
the ambivalence of some of its own empirical work on this point, has 
maintained the view that the deregulatory approach of its 1994 Jobs 
Strategy retains ‘plausibility’ (OECD, 2004: 165).  The World Bank’s 
Doing Business Report for 2008 states without equivocation that ‘laws 
created to protect workers often hurt them’ and that ‘more flexible labour 
regulations boost job creation’ (World Bank, 2008: 19).   
 
The core of the problem lies in the continuing use of the assumptions of 
orthodox theory to drive the analysis on which policy is based.  The belief 
that the labour market, if left alone, will self-correct, is not simply the 
basis of the policy argument for deregulation, it also has methodological 
implications: ‘adherents to the new orthodox view search the data for 
specifications/measures that support their priors, while barely noticing 
evidence that goes against them’ (Freeman, 2005: 10).  As Freeman 
suggests, one possible response to this approach is get better evidence of 
how labour laws operate at firm and industry level.  He also points out that 
longitudinal evidence, which ‘most empiricists would regard as providing 
a more valid and stronger test of any claim’, is to be preferred to the cross-
sectional regressions on which the current orthodoxy rests (2005: 14-15).  
He also refers to the need to take into account the multiple institutional 




configurations which, in particular contexts, can alter outcomes, while also 
noting the difficulties inherent in studying these interactions empirically: 
there are some configurations for which no evidence is available; others 
may be found to be unique to single countries; and the relatively small 
number of countries for which good data exist, coupled with the slow rate 
of institutional change, mean that there may be relatively few data points 
compared to the number of possible institutional combinations.   
 
D. IDENTIFYING CORE HYPOTHESES AND RELEVANT EMPIRICAL 
METHODS 
 
We can sum up the discussion so far by identifying, in general terms, some 
core claims or hypotheses which come out of our theoretical review, and 
considering their implications for empirical research. 
 
A first claim might be called the indeterminacy hypothesis; in other words, 
the economic effects of a given labour law reform are a priori 
indeterminate.  This could be for various reasons: because labour law rules 
tend to emerge out of particular contexts, their effects will not be constant 
across all firms or industries; the application of labour regulations is 
dependent on a range of complex factors beyond the law which vary 
according to sectoral and national conditions, and to the point in the 
economic cycle at which legal changes are introduced; and, labour law 
rules can, in principle, have both positive and negative effects, which may 
offset each other.  If all or some of these claims were correct, it would 
only be possible to predict the impacts of labour laws if a great deal were 
known about the contexts in which the relevant rules originated and in 
which they were applied.  In an extreme form, the argument from 
indeterminacy becomes a claim about triviality: because of the 
endogeneity of of its emergence and the contingency surrounding its 
impact, it is unlikely that labour law can ever be a long-run causal factor 
independently influencing the path of economic development; at best it 
might be a cipher for other economic or institutional forces.   
 
A second claim is the legal origins hypothesis advanced by Botero et al. 
(2004) in the labour law field.   As we have seen, this holds that the 
content of labour law is determined to a significant degree by the legal 
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origins of national systems.  In the strong form of this hypothesis, the 
persistent effect of legal origin is an exogenous causal factor which is 
likely to lead to inefficiency, particularly in the civil law world and in 
systems into which norms are transplanted through copying, colonization 
of conquest.  The weak-form hypothesis sees a link between legal origin 
and the content of laws but is sceptical on the efficiency implications of 
this. 
 
A third claim is the complementarity hypothesis which can be derived 
from the comparative political economy literature.  This maintains that the 
impacts of labour law rules depend upon the interaction of labour 
regulation with complementary institutions operating within particular 
national systems (or, by extension, at other relevant levels such as 
individual industries or transnational trading blocs).  In particular, labour 
law rules might be expected to operate differently in liberal market 
systems and coordinated market systems, respectively.  This set of claims 
overlaps to some degree with the other two.  It shares with the 
indeterminacy hypothesis the view that labour law rules are at least partly 
endogenous to particular national or local contexts, without going so far as 
to imply that their effects are so radically contingent, or as trivial, as the 
indeterminacy approach suggests.  It shares with the weak-form legal 
origins hypothesis an interest in legal infrastructure as a possible causal 
influence on economic development, but leaves open the possibility that 
the civil law ‘regulatory style’, for example, is complementary to the 
wider context of the coordinated market systems in which it mostly 
applies, and so compatible with efficiency (contrary to the strong-form 
legal origins hypothesis). 
 
To test these claims, a more thorough empirical understanding of how 
legal systems operate is needed.  As we have seen, the empirical literature 
is moving in the direction of studies which take into account a range of 
contextual effects relevant to the emergence and application of legal rules.  
There is also general agreement on the need to have better time-series 
data.  It is with these points in mind that we now turn to have a closer look 
at recent developments in the evidence base relating to legal systems.  
 




III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR 
LAW SYSTEMS 
 
A.  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN LEGAL INDEX CONSTRUCTION 
 
A number of studies have recently developed measures of the intensity of 
labour regulation which have been used in cross-national empirical studies 
to estimate the impact of the law.  One of the first of these was the 
OECD’s EPL strictness indicator.  This adapts an index first constructed 
by Grubb and Wells (1993).  The index consists, in the first instance, of 18 
items, which are grouped into three categories: rules affecting the 
dismissal of workers with ‘regular contracts’, a term which refers to 
contracts of employment of indeterminate duration; rules relating to fixed-
term and temporary (agency) contracts; and regulations, over and above 
those in the first two categories, governing collective dismissals.  The 
information contained in the 18 items is drawn, in the first instance, from 
accounts of the formal laws in force in 28 OECD member states.  Scores 
are assigned on a number of bases, which include the length of time it 
takes to give notice of dismissal and the number of months of mandated 
severance pay; in other cases, ordinal scales are used, for example, to 
indicate the strictness of the legal tests for judging the fairness of 
dismissal.  The scores are standardized and expressed on a scale from 0 to 
6, with 6 representing maximum strictness.  Once the values for individual 
variables are set in this way, they are aggregated into a smaller number of 
units, which are weighted and combined again to form three indicators 
representing the strictness of regulation of regular contracts, temporary 
contracts and collective dismissals.  Finally, an overall indicator of 
strictness for each country is arrived by combining the three main 
indicators, with collective dismissals weighted at 40% of the other two (on 
the basis that this indicator covers rules operating over and above those 
which are captured by the first two indicators). 
 
The data contained in the OECD index cover three points in time, 
corresponding to the three main data-gathering exercises which the OECD 
has conducted: the late 1980s, the late 1990s, and 2003.  The collective 
dismissals indicator was only introduced in the 1999 exercise, so two 
versions of the overall indicator exist: version 1, covering the rules 
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governing regular and temporary contracts only (without the rules on 
collective dismissals), goes back to the first exercise in the 1980s, while 
version 2, with the addition of the collective dismissal rules, only covers 
the last two exercises.  A detailed account of the laws in force in 2003 has 
been provided and justifications offered for the scores arrived at.  Changes 
in the law which took place in between the three main data gathering 
exercises have also been collected, so that it becomes possible to construct 
an annual time series. 
 
The authors of the OECD index accept that it suffers from limitations 
which are ‘inherent to most synthetic indices’ and which include 
‘problems of subjectivity, the difficulty of attributing scores on the basis 
of legal provisions that may be applied differently in practice, and the 
choice of the weighting scheme used to calculate the summary indicator 
form from the various sub-components’ (OECD, 2004: 99).  Steps have 
been taken to address some of these issues, but some remain intractable.  
The index takes into account, for example, benefits set out in collective 
agreements and contractual practices which are widely followed in some 
countries, such as Japan, where their operation is well documented, but for 
some countries there are no reliable data on these issues.  The role of 
judicial interpretation is also noted along with aspects of court procedure 
which can affect the enforcement of rights.  Evidence on court practice has 
been collated and is reflected in the scores given to some of the variables 
on unfair dismissal remedies (OECD, 2004: 66).   
 
Some patterns emerge from the OECD data on the state of the law.  There 
is a wide variation across countries which is mainly accounted for by 
differences in the regulation of temporary and fixed-term contracts; there 
has, however, been a degree of convergence since the early 1990s, largely 
as a result of deregulation, although this has been limited.  The rankings of 
countries has changed very little over time, with the so-called Anglo-
Saxon systems having the lowest scores, those in southern Europe having 
the highest, with the northern European and Nordic systems in the middle. 
 
Cross-sectional, bivariate analyses reported in the 2004 OECD 
Employment Outlook indicate a link between EPL strictness, as measured 
by the OECD index, and flows into and out of unemployment, although 
the association is weak (in relation to the 2003 data gathering exercise the 
relationship between EPL strictness and flows out of unemployment is 




negative but not statistically significant).  There is no consistent 
relationship either way with unemployment.  The 2004 Employment 
Outlook accepts that bivariate and time-specific analyses of this kind can 
only provide limited information and should not be used to guide policy.  
It therefore reports additional tests which take advantage of the time series 
of EPL strictness which has been constructed in the way just described.  
When this is done, a correlation between EPL and higher unemployment is 
established, and there is evidence of a negative impact of EPL on 
unemployment flows.  The changes in EPL which took place over the 
course of the 1990s, which mainly consisted of relaxations to the laws 
governing temporary and fixed-term work, are correlated with an increase 
in the adoption of temporary and fixed-term contracts (OECD, 2004: 79).   
 
The other main indicator of labour regulation which is currently in use is 
the ‘employing workers index’ of the World Bank, which is published 
annually in its Doing Business reports.  This builds on the labour 
regulation index drawn up by Botero et al. (2004) and is one of the series 
of indicators developed by the members of legal origin school.  The index 
prepared by Botero et al. has a wider scope than the EPL strictness 
indicator as it covers not just employment protection but other areas of 
labour law, including strike law and the law of employee representation, as 
well as aspects of social security legislation, including unemployment 
insurance.  It also extends to a wider range of both developed and 
developing countries.  The index contains over 100 indicators each of 
which is defined according to an algorithm which sets out the basis for the 
coding.  The resulting scores (which are mostly expressed on a zero to 1 
scale) are normalized and averaged to produce composite variables on 
particular areas of law.  For example, the indicator ‘cost of firing workers’ 
is built up from six sub-units which code the law on such matters as the 
mandated length of notice period, the mandated severance pay, and so on.  
The resulting composite variable measures the cost of firing 20 per cent of 
the firm’s workforce, ‘10% for redundancy and 10% without cause’.  The 
following assumptions are made:  
 
‘The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum of the 
notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties 
established by law or mandatory collective agreements for 
a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If 
dismissal is illegal, we set the cost of firing equal to the 
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annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal 
wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing 
workers.  The cost of firing workers is computed as the 
ratio of the new wage bill to the old one.’ (Botero et al., 
2004) 
 
This variable is then aggregated with others (‘alternative employment 
contracts’, ‘cost of increasing hours’ and ‘dismissal procedures’) to 
produce a single indicator for ‘employment laws’.  Similar procedures are 
used to arrive at scores for ‘collective relations laws’ and ‘social security 
laws’.  The three sub-indices can then be combined to produce a single 
country score.  
 
The Botero et al. index simply cites as its main source ‘the laws of each 
country’.  A number of more specific sources of general relevance to 
labour law are referred to, including legal encyclopaedias and 
compendiums of social security laws, but, in contrast to the OECD’s index 
of EPL strictness, no explanations are given for the values attributed to the 
basic informational units at country level.  The index is purely cross-
sectional: it reports the state of the law at a loosely-defined point in the 
late 1990s.   
 
The main finding of the analysis carried out by Botero et al. (2004) was 
that labour regulation is highly correlated with legal origin, with systems 
in the French civil law family having the highest scores and those in the 
English common law family the lowest.  On the basis of cross-sectional 
bivariate analyses the study also reports negative impacts of labour 
regulation.  Higher scores on the index are correlated with lower male 
employment, higher youth unemployment, and a larger informal economy.  
However, the correlations are not consistently strong or significant (see 
Pozen, 2006, for a critique).  Because the index is cross-sectional, it 
cannot be used to study the effects of changes in labour law regulation 
over time, nor can it capture dynamic interaction effects of the kind 
hypothesized in the comparative political economy literature. 
 
The World Bank’s employing workers index adopts the methodology of 
Botero et al. (2004) but has a somewhat different content. It is built up 
from three sub-indices: a ‘rigidity of employment index’, an index of non-
wage labour costs, and one which measures firing costs.  The rigidity of 




employment index contains sub-indices, covering ‘difficulty of hiring’, 
‘rigidity of hours’ and ‘difficulty of firing’.  These are broken down again, 
so that the difficulty of hiring index, for example, measures ‘(i) whether 
fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum 
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the 
minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value 
per worker’.  As in the original Botero et al. study, definitions of the base 
units are set out and protocols established for coding.  Values are 
expressed as scores between 0 and 100, with 100 representing ‘more rigid 
regulation’.  Countries are ranked on the basis of their scores. 
 
The sources on which the index is based are stated to be ‘a detailed survey 
of employment regulations that is completed by local lawyers and public 
officials’; laws, regulations and secondary sources ‘are reviewed to ensure 
accuracy’ (World Bank, 2008).  The index is in the form of a time series 
which is updated each year; it begins in 2004, taking advantage of the 
regular survey administered by the World Bank, but there has been no 
attempt to code laws further back than this. 
 
A principal feature of the World Bank index, building on Botero et al. 
(2004), is that while it is based largely on textual evidence of formal laws, 
supplemented by survey results on perceptions of regulatory stringency, it 
tries to capture actual costs as they impact on firms.  More precisely, the 
evaluations of the effects of laws are assumed to measure their impact on a 
particular category of worker (a middle-aged, male, full-time employee 
with 20 years service in the same company earning the company’s average 
wage and not a member of a trade union, unless membership is 
mandatory) and a particular type of firm (which among other things is a 
limited liability company located in the country’s capital city, 100% 
domestically owned and employing just over 200 employees  (World 
Bank, 2008b)).  These may, in a sense, be ‘standard’ cases as they 
represent the contexts to which labour law regulations most easily apply 
and for which many of them were initially designed.  However, they are 
not in any sense representative cases, particularly in many developing 
countries where only a small proportion of the overall working population 
will fit this description.  But even in developed systems where ‘standard’ 
work in large manufacturing firms remains widespread, World Bank index 
will not capture the extent to which labour law rules are modulated in 
other contexts, such as those involving small and medium-sized 
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enterprises.  The World Bank index has chosen to focus not on an average 
case but on one in which the law is at its most protective or, in the World 
Bank’s own terms, most ‘rigid’ (Berg and Cazes, 2007; Lee and McCann, 
2007).  It cannot even be assumed that, in the ‘standard cases’ on which 
the employing workers index is based, an accurate assessment of actual 
costs can be gauged from the combination of legal texts and survey 
evidence on which the index relies.  The index is based on the assumption 
that the firm in question ‘abides by every law and regulation but does not 
grant workers more benefits than mandated by law, regulation or (if 
applicable) collective bargaining agreement’ (World Bank, 2008b).  Thus 
no account is taken of the degree to which the ‘standard’ firm already 
observes the standards set out in the law, or, in practice, exceeds them.  
‘Standard’ firms are precisely those which are most likely to do both.  For 
these various reasons, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the World 
Bank index is not, as it purports to be, a measure of actual costs. 
 
B. NEW TIME SERIES EVIDENCE: THE CBR INDICES ON 
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND LABOUR 
REGULATION 
 
A set of longitudinal indices on the evolution of company, insolvency and 
labour law has been developed over the past three years by a team of 
economists and lawyers at the Centre for Business Research (‘CBR’) in 
Cambridge.  The aim of this project has been (among other things) to 
examine the claims of the legal origin hypothesis, using time series 
evidence.  The nature of the CBR datasets will now be briefly explained; 
more complete accounts are available elsewhere and the reader is referred 
to these papers (see Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; 
Armour et al., 2007) and to the project home page, where the indices are 
available on line 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm), for a 
fuller explanation. 
 
The CBR datasets cover the development of the law in five countries 
(France, Germany, India, the UK and the US) over the period 1970-2005 
using a wide range of indicators which are intended to provide a 
comprehensive map of the law in the areas under review.  Datasets have 




also been constructed for a larger number of countries over a shorter 
period of time (1995-2006), focusing on a sub-sample of legal variables 
which is weighted so as to capture the state of the law in undergoing the 
most rapid change.  In this paper we will focus on the datasets covering 
the longer period, and look at the experience of the four developed 
systems in the sample, namely France, Germany, the UK and the US.1 
 
The CBR’s labour regulation dataset draws on methods first used in the 
OECD and World Bank studies, but modifies them in ways which are 
intended to address some of the methodological problems which were 
encountered in the construction of those datasets.   The CBR index for 
labour regulation contains 40 basic variables which are aggregated into 
five areas: alternative employment contracts, regulation of working time, 
regulation of dismissal, employee representation, and industrial action.  As 
in the case of the Botero et al. index, an algorithm is prepared setting out 
the definition of each variable and the approach to the way the law of each 
country is coded; as with the OECD, detailed explanations are given of the 
basis for the codings, and the legal sources relied on are fully set out.  
These are the primary legal sources, rather than the summary descriptions 
of legal rules provided by the OECD.   
 
The CBR index differs from its predecessors in two main respects.  Firstly, 
it aims to reflect the systemic nature of legal rules, that is, the sense in 
which the function of a given legal rule alters according to the nature of its 
structural relationship to other legal and non-legal rules in a given national 
context.  While, in broad terms, legal rules relating to the business 
enterprise can be understood to perform certain functions of general 
relevance in market economies, across national systems it is by no means 
the case that the same formal rule always performs the same function.  The 
relevant rule can often be found outside the legal system altogether.  It 
follows that when thinking about rules as functional equivalents, it is 
necessary to look beyond the formal law (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998).  Thus 
the CBR index takes into account collective agreements and, in the case of 
the shareholder protection index, corporate governance codes of practice, 
                                                 
1  The CBR dataset also covers India (see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007).  India 
raises special considerations when analysing the economic impact of legal rules, 
because of the issue of the enforcement of labour laws, and the large informal 
sector.  Accordingly we leave the analysis of the Indian case for future research. 
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in addition to formal legal rules, where they can be considered as 
functional equivalents to legal rules.  An example of this is the coding of 
sector level collective agreements on working time in the UK which, 
thanks to the equivalent of extension legislation, operated as a de facto 
floor of rights up to the 1980s, when this form of statutory prop for 
collective bargaining was withdrawn and the collective agreements 
themselves began to break up.  Secondly, and relatedly, the CBR index 
attempts to capture variations in the degree of bindingness of legal rules.  
Specifically, this means taking into account the form of labour law rules, 
many of which are not mandatory at all but operate as default rules which 
can be varied by individual or collective agreement.  The index also seeks 
to capture the extent to which labour standards can be modified for 
particular types of enterprise or work relationship.  On the whole, 
graduated variables are preferred to simple binary scores of dummy 
variables. 
 
To illustrate in more detail the way in which the index was constructed, 
the Appendix sets out the part of it which refers to dismissal laws in the 
United Kingdom.  This sub-index on the regulation of dismissal contains 
nine variables, which cover matters ranging from the rules on legally 
mandated minimum notice periods to the law governing priority in re-
employment.   The Table sets out the algorithm according to which each 
variable is defined, the score given to the law for each year in the period 
covered by the index, and the explanation for the coding.  The complete 
codings, covering all forty variables for the full range of years and 
countries in the dataset, may be consulted online.2 
 
It follows from the account of the construction of the index which has just 
been given that it does not purport to estimate the actual impact of labour 
law rules on a representative enterprise.  As we have seen, attempts to do 
this run up against some fundamental difficulties which are likely to 
render the results excessively artificial.  The CBR index sets out, more 
straightforwardly, to measure the extent of regulation, understood as the 
degree to which a rule protects the interests of workers as opposed to those 
of employers, using as a benchmark a scale set out in an algorithm 
developed for this purpose.   
 
                                                 
2   See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm. 




Does this not produce an even more artificial set of results than those of 
the World Bank, which at least attempt to get beyond the formal legal 
rules by incorporating estimates of actual costs and which incorporate the 
possibility of non-enforcement by obtaining survey evidence on 
perceptions of regulation?  Our response to this point is that it is preferable 
not to try to measure actual costs at enterprise level by means of a 
synthetic index of this kind: it is better to accept that this is impossible 
given the wide range of contexts in which labour law rules apply and the 
multiplicity of factors through which formal rules are mediated when they 
are observed and applied at micro level.  Moreover, having an index of 
formal rules does not rule out taking steps to look at actual effects.  It is 
possible to control for the non-application of laws in practice, or for their 
non-enforcement, by using measures of institutional effectiveness such as 
the World Bank’s rule of law index (see Armour et al., 2007).  
Alternatively, indices based on the formal strength of laws can be 
amended in the light of evidence of their implementation, as in the case of 
the index of the effective observance of working time laws constructed by 
Lee and McCann (2007).  At the same time, having a measure of the 
formal law which is not, in itself, qualified by issues of enforcement, can 
be useful for other purposes, for example in seeing to what extent formal 
legal changes are correlated with ‘upstream’ influences on the political 
process such as interest group coalitions or macroeconomic shocks.   
 
In the case of the four countries studied here, all of which are developed 
economies with well functioning legal systems, it may be assumed that 
labour laws are, on the whole, well observed.  This is not to say that 
enforcement is always effective or that it is entirely uniform across these 
four systems, or within each of them; however, any enforcement 
difficulties are of a different order to those affecting some developing 
systems for which it would be appropriate to make use of indices which 
seek to capture the effectiveness of the legal system. 
  
A further feature of the CBR index is that, in its construction, no prior 
assumptions, positive or negative, are made about the impacts of legal 
rules.  It seeks to be a pure measure of the content of the rule which does 
not assume that the law necessarily imposes on employers net  ‘costs’ or 
‘rigidities’, to use the language of the World Bank, or that increasing 
regulation is necessarily associated with increasing ‘strictness’, as the 
OECD puts it.  As we have seen, labour law rules can have positive 
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economic effects, and employers, as well as workers, may benefit from the 
use of the law to solve collective action and coordination problems.  In 
case of the OECD and World Bank scales, it is assumed that a higher score 
necessarily equates to an undesirable outcome for the employer, and a 
lower score to a better outcome.  The highest score is assumed to be the 
worst possible outcome for the employer and the lowest score the best.  
No such assumption is made in the CBR scales: it is possible to have too 
high, but also too low a level of regulation, for both employers and 
workers.  The precise level of the ‘optimal’ score is not known a priori, on 
the basis that it will most likely differ from system to system, and that it is 
the purpose of the index to chart this variation as far as possible.   
 
The World Bank index has been criticized because its indicators ‘do not 
consider the positive externalities of labour regulations’ (Berg and Cazes, 
2007: 6).  The algorithms used by the World Bank studies repeatedly refer 
to ‘costs’ and ‘rigidities’ being imposed on employers as a result of 
regulation, and nowhere refer to potential benefits.  In itself, this might not 
prevent the index being shown to be correlated to positive outcome 
variables; the same point applies to the OECD index.  The issue is 
whether, given their theoretical priors, these indices exhibit a systematic 
bias in their choice of variables and weightings which make such a result 
unlikely.  This is not altogether clear; in its favour, the Botero et al. index 
correlates well with evidence of the perceptions of the strength of labour 
law regulation drawn from a large-scale survey which included trade 
union officials and labour law academics as well as employers (Chor and 
Freeman, 2005).  Perhaps the best that can be said is that given the 
theoretical assumptions driving this index, it is noteworthy that its 
empirical analysis does not give a very clear picture of the supposed 
negative effects of labour law (see Pozen, 2006).  
 
The CBR index does not solve all the problems associated with index 
construction.  Every index contains an implicit weighting, in so far as a 
decision has to be taken either to weight each variable equally, or to alter 
the weighting to reflect a view of their comparative importance.  This can 
be done country by country, given that it is unlikely, in principle, that the 
same law has the same systemic importance in each system; 
codetermination laws, for example, might be thought to play a pivotal role 
in Germany which would justify weighting employee representation 
scores more heavily in an overall assessment of the intensity of labour law 




regulation in that country than would be the case in France or the UK (see 
Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  While weighting of this kind can be done, 
we have chosen not to weight the variables in the CBR index for the 
purposes of the present analysis, largely because it is not clear that this can 
be done on an objectively verifiable basis (see the discussion in Deakin, 
Lele and Siems, 2007).  The OECD’s EPL strictness indicator uses 
weightings extensively when aggregating the individual informational 
units into composite indicators; many of weightings are not explained and 
not self-evidently justified.  Botero et al. (2004), by contrast, make no 
attempt at a priori weightings, and we follow their approach here. 
 
As we have seen, all synthetic indices of this type involve some degree of 
subjective judgment on the scores attributed to particular variables.  The 
issue is not whether each individual score is beyond dispute, since there 
will always be some scope for disagreement among legal scholars and 
others about the precise value to be attributed to a given variable, but 
whether the coding is consistent across countries and across time 
(Spamann, 2007; Berg and Cazes, 2007).  This means constructing the 
variables so as to avoid selection biases which might, for example, skew 
the outcomes either for or against a particular system.  It is possible, for 
example, that the CBR labour regulation index suffers from a country-
specific bias, in so far as the inclusion of variables on the equal treatment 
of part-time and temporary work reflect laws of the kind which are found 
in European Union countries (thanks in part to individual country 
traditions and also to the harmonizing impact of EU directives) but 
virtually nowhere else, and in particular not in the US case.  We have 
sought to mitigate this problem by defining the relevant variables in 
functional, country-neutral terms, and in judging how far, from the 
operation of other forms of regulation such as laws governing basic labour 
standards, US law permits the differential treatment of part-time or fixed-
term workers.  It is also possible to object to the CBR index on the 
grounds that the choice of variables will, in and of itself, unduly depress 
the US score, simply because of the absence of unjust dismissal legislation 
in that system.  This is undeniably a problem, but another way of looking 
at the issue is simply to accept that US laws on employment at will, by 
their nature, imply a much lower score on these variables than the scores 
for the European countries in the sample. 
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF LABOUR 
REGULATION 
 
It is now time to turn to the analysis.  What can we learn from a first look 
at the long-term time series provided by the CBR datasets? 
 
We first look at the degree of covariance in the level of protection across 
the four countries and the extent of their divergence or convergence over 
time.  Figure 1 indicates that France and Germany had a considerably 
higher degree of regulation than the other two systems throughout the 
period in question.  Legal origin also seems to make a difference.    As 
Table 1, Part I shows, the difference between the common law systems 
and the rest was substantial and statistically significant in respect of the 
index as a whole and each of its main component parts.   
 
In itself, this does not establish that legal infrastructure is responsible for 
diversity of practice.  It is not possible directly to observe aspects of legal 
infrastructure, such as the respective role of courts and legislatures, in the 
dataset.  The observed divergence may be compatible with the weak-form 
legal origins effect, in which legal systems serve as ‘carriers of history’ to 
perpetuate institutional complementarities arising at national level, but are 

































































































Series  a Eng t R-Sq 
I. Panel Data 
Analysis1 
    
(i) All (RE) 0.64***  -0.43**  0.83 
(ii) Alternative 
employment 
contracts  (RE) 
0.74***  -0.5***  0.76 
(iii) Regulation of 0.66*** -0.5***  0.86 
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working time (RE) 
(iv) Regulation of 
dismissal (FE) 




0.61***   -0.45***  0.73 
(vi) Industrial 
action (RE) 





    
(i ) All [AR (1)] 70.004***     -0.02 0.79 
(ii) Alternative 
employment 
contracts [AR (1)] 
   84.67***  -0.84** 0.82 
(iii) Regulation of 
working time [AR 
(1)] 
68.51***       0.8 0.81 
(iv) Regulation of 
dismissal [AR (1)] 
90.64***   -1.36*** 0.64 
(v) Employee 
representation  
[AR (1)]  
   62.38      0.94 0.84 
(vi) Industrial 
action [AR (1)] 
53.43***      0.72* 0.85 
 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*  Significant at 10 per cent level. 
 
1  The following panel regression has been fitted: 
 
Y = a + b.Eng 
 
where Y is the series on legal protection , Eng = 1 for UK and USA and = 0 for 
France and Germany.  Results reported here are either based on the random 
effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) model depending on the outcome of Breusch-
Pagan test. The particular model used is referred to in parentheses. In each case 
both the models give more or less the same result. 
  
2  The following trend regression has been fitted: 





Y = a + b.t 
 
where   Y is the series on coefficient of variation in different aspects of  legal 
protection in two legal groups – English Law and Civil Law – and t is the time 
trend. The procedure for arriving at the estimates is referred to in each column; it 
is AR (1), decided on the basis of Lagrange multiplier test of autocorrelation.  
 




If we were observing the strong-form legal origin effect, we would expect 
it to be a consistently powerful constraint on convergence.  We do not 
observe a time-invariant effect of this kind.  The overall picture is one of 
convergence between common law and civil law systems during the 
1970s, followed by sharp divergence in the early 1980s and some 
convergence again in the following years (see Figure 2).  More formally, 
Table 1, Part II reports the findings of a trend analysis (taking into account 
the problem of auto-correlated residuals) of the time series of the 
coefficients of variation (standard deviations as percentages of the mean) 
in the different components of the index, breaking down the sample of 
countries by legal origin (English law and civil law).   Changes in the 
coefficient of variation over time can be used to provide a measure of the 
extent of convergence and divergence between systems, with a lower score 
indicating greater convergence.  The evidence in Figure 2 and Table 1 
show that there is no statistically significant converging trend for the 
aggregate index over the whole period of our study.  This is also true of 
the sub-indices for regulation of working time employee representation: 
these show a once-and-for-all diverging jump in the early 1980s and a 
slow trend to convergence in the early 2000s.  However, regulations on 
alternative employment contracts and regulation of dismissal show 
statistically significant converging trends.  The sub-index on the regulation 
of industrial action shows divergence since the early 1980s and a more 
recent tendency towards convergence; across the entire period, there is an 
overall diverging trend which is barely statistically significant (see Table 











Common Law (UK and US) vs. Civil Law (France and Germany): Coefficients of 




















 Source: CBR Labour Regulation dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm). 
 
There is then, some support for the legal origin hypothesis, but it is 
qualified.  Unlike the cases of the law governing shareholder protection 
and creditor rights, where analysis of the equivalent CBR datasets reveal 
no clear pattern of regulation at all by reference to the common law or 
civil law divide (see Armour et al., 2008), here there is one.  Legal origin 
therefore appears to matter for labour law in a way it does not for 
company law and insolvency law.  However, when we look more closely 
at the labour law findings, the picture gets cloudier.  There is some 
evidence of convergence, legal origin notwithstanding, in the areas of 
dismissal law and the regulation of the law governing alternative contracts 
of employment.  This represents the partial convergence of British labour 
law on the unfair dismissal model which is, historically, much more 
deeply rooted in the experience of the civil law countries, France and, in 
particular, Germany.  The UK adopted unfair dismissal for the first time in 
the early 1970s, and since the mid-1970s has more or less kept intact this 




form of regulation.3  Weakening of the legislation in the mid-1980s 
reflects the lengthening of qualifying periods and related changes to the 
coverage of the law, but this trend was reversed in the 1990s, when EU 
law led to the removal of hours thresholds which discriminated against 
part-time workers.  Since the mid-1990s there has been a considerable 
alignment of UK practice on the regulation of alternative forms of the 
employment contract, which has come about thanks to the adoption of the 
EU directives on the rights of part-time and fixed-term contract workers. 
 
Common law legal origin did not prevent the UK from adjusting to a type 
of legislation which had continental European origins.  The initial impetus 
for this process did not come from the EU; the UK first adopted unfair 
dismissal legislation in 1971, under a Conservative government, and at a 
point when there were no European directives in force on labour law 
issues.  There still is no directive requiring general unfair dismissal 
legislation across the EU.  The rapprochement of UK law with European 
standards on flexible forms of employment which has taken place since 
the mid-1990s is the result of the implementation of EU directives, as is 
the revival of working time regulation, which nevertheless remains below 
the level which prevailed at the end of the 1970s when sector collective 
agreements on working hours were still in force.  Notwithstanding some 
limitations in the UK model, its framework of individual employment law 
is now significantly closer to that of Germany and France than it was a 
decade ago.  There remains a much more substantial gap in relation to 
collective labour law.  Since the mid-1990s the closed shop has not 
returned nor have there been major changes in strike law (aside from a 
strengthening of the right not to be dismissed when taking lawful strike 
action); there has, however, been some strengthening of the law governing 
employee representation, as a result, again, of the implementation in the 
UK of EU directives in this area. 
 
The role of political shifts in the development of the law can be seen from 
the data.  The big jump in the regulation of dismissal law, working time 
and employee representation which occurred in France in the early 1980s 
                                                 
3  As noted above, full details on this and other aspects of changes in labour law 
in the four countries concerned set out in the text are available on the CBR 
website along with the dataset: 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm. 
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took place under the Auroux laws of the first Mitterand government.  At 
the same point, the Thatcher government was removing working time 
controls and reversing legislation supporting the closed shop and the right 
to strike, although it made hardly any changes to unfair dismissal law.  
This turning point aside, it is hard to point to strong political pressures as 
the cause of change.  Conservative French governments throughout the 
period under review have made little impact on the high level of labour 
law regulation achieved by the 1980s reforms; changes to working time 
legislation, for example, have been relatively minor, and have mostly 
taken the form of converting mandatory standards into default rules and 
extending the role of collective bargaining at the expense of binding 
legislation.  In Germany, there has been a high level of political consensus 
across the period as a whole.  The limited deregulation of aspects of 
dismissal law which was part of the Hartz reforms of the 2000s was 
brought about by a social democratic-led administration.  All this suggests 
that when partisan politics directly influences the direction of legal 
change, it tends to do so through once-and-for-all adjustments of the kind 
experienced in Britain and France in the early 1980s; the more normal 
pattern is one of cross-party consensus on labour law matters. 
 
The level of protection for workers provided by US law during the period 
is not only well below that of the other three countries; it is also relatively 
unchanging.  This does not necessarily represent a political consensus on 
labour law matters, but it does reflect the logjam on legislative reform 
which has operated at federal level.  The scores in the index were not 
altered to reflect changes in the law governing employment at will in some 
states.  In principle, changes in the law at state level can be captured in the 
dataset if they are significantly widespread and affect more populous 
states (see Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007).  However, the changes which 
took place were negligible when set against the much more rigorous legal 
standards governing termination of employment in Europe.  Thus they are 
not regarded as significantly affecting the national picture.4 
                                                 
4   In this regard, we take the same view as the authors of the OECD EPL 
strictness indicator, and Botero et al. 2004.  It is arguable that we should take into 
account the likelihood that the proportion of American workers covered by a just-
cause provision of some kind is as high as 34% once collective agreements in 
both the public and private sector are taken into account, along with contractual 
provisions governing termination (Verkerke, 2008).  However, these agreements 





What can we say about the economic impacts of legal change?  It is 
possible to undertake a time series analysis, looking at the relationship 
between changes in the values in the legal time series, with long-run 
movements in employment, productivity and redistribution.  The results 
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   ALL 
(variables 1 to 
40) 
   
France -0.02 0.36***    0.02 0.65 1.86 AR (1) 
Germany1 -0.21 1.31***    0.34 0.18 2.22 OLS 
UK -0.004 0.37***   -0.003 0.48 2.15 AR (2) 
USA   0.04** 0.11***   -0.21 0.51 2.06 AR (1) 
   Alternative 
employment 
contracts 
(variables 1 to 8) 
   
France -0.12*** 0.35*** 0.008 0.67 1.85 AR (1) 
                                                                                                                         
and provisions mostly operate at individual employer level; they are not the result 
of legally-binding multi-employer agreements which, in the case of UK working 
time regulation up to the late 1970s, could be regarded as the functional 
equivalent of legislation, and were coded accordingly.   
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Germany1 -0.26 1.31*** 0.33 0.2 2.23 OLS 
UK -0.007 0.37*** 0.01 0.51 2.16 AR (2) 
   Regulation of 
working time 
(variables 9 to 
15) 
   
France -0.13** 0.36***  0.17** 0.69 1.89 AR (1) 
Germany1 -0.19 1.34***  0.31 0.18 2.21 OLS 
UK -0.003 0.37*** -0.008 0.5 2.15 AR (2) 
   Regulation of 
dismissal 
(variables 16 to 
24) 
   
France -0.01 0.35***  0.002 0.64 1.89 AR (1) 
Germany1 -0.05 1.28***  0.07 0.17 2.2 OLS 
UK -0.02 0.4***  0.03 0.51 2.15 AR (2) 
USA  0.02*** 0.09 -0.05*** 0.51 2.06 AR (1) 
   Employee 
representation 
(variables 25 to 
31) 
   
France -0.02* 0.35***  0.02 0.66 1.81 AR (1) 
Germany1 -0.36 1.23***  0.5 0.18 2.26 OLS 
UK -0.001 0.36*** -0.01 0.5 2.16 AR (2) 
   Industrial action 
(variables 32 to 
40) 
   
France -0.14 0.35***  0.16 0.65 1.81 AR (1) 
Germany1 0.12 1.24*** -0.33 0.2 2.26 OLS 
UK 0.0001 0.36*** -0.01 0.5 2.16 AR (2) 




      
   ALL 
(1 to 40) 
   
France2 0.42 78.27***   3.27 0.35 2.08 OLS 
Germany1 -26.54 58.32 50.08 0.11 1.52 OLS 
UK 2.67 102.82*** 14.49 0.3 1.77 AR(1) 
USA2 -4.98 56.62** 48.47* 0.17 1.56 OLS 
   Alternative 
employment 
contracts 
(variables 1 to 8) 
   
France2 1.26 75.29***  0.99 0.34 2.09 OLS 
Germany1 -0.26 47.66*  2.95 0.05 1.48 OLS 




UK 2.23 103.34** -3.57 0.31 1.76 AR(1) 
   Regulation of 
working time 
(variables 9 to 
15) 
   
France2 -7.17 75.07*** 13.13 0.35 2.07 OLS 
Germany -23.65** 62.41** 43.84*** 0.17 1.64 OLS 
UK     1.54 104.06**   1.59 0.29 1.76 AR (1) 
   Regulation of 
dismissal 
(variables 16 to 
24) 
   
France2   0.56   77.39*** 1.95 0.34 2.01 OLS 
Germany1 -8.64**   59.9** 23.1** 0.18 1.63 OLS 
UK   1.48 103.12*** 0.38 0.29 1.75 AR (1) 
USA2   0.39   56.62** 10.74* 0.17 1.56 OLS 
   Employee 
representation 
(variables 25 to 
31) 
   
France2   0.93   74.41*** 2.06 0.34 2.07 OLS 
Germany1 18.44   47.14* 24.22 0.06 1.55 OLS 
UK    1.56 103.21*** -0.82 0.29 1.76 AR (1) 
   Industrial action 
(variables 32 to 
40) 
   
France2  -8.77   73.22*** 13.13 0.33 2.06 OLS 
Germany 10.33   47.29* 19.77 0.08 1.56 OLS 
UK   0.66 103.59** 1.79 0.29 1.75 AR(1) 
(C)Wage 
Share(WGSH) 
      
   ALL 
(1 to 40) 
   
France 0.7*** -0.21***  0.04 0.97 1.93 AR (2) 
Germany1 0.68*** -0.2***  0.05 0.94 1.75 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.24*** -0.01 0.64 1.95 AR (2) 
USA2 0.7*** -0.14*** -0.19 0.65 1.73 AR (1) 
   Alternative 
employment 
contracts 
(variables 1 to 8) 
   
France 0.72*** -0.21***  0.01 0.97 1.9 AR (2) 
Germany1 0.73*** -0.2*** -0.03 0.94 1.76 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.24*** -0.004 0.64 1.96 AR (2) 
   Regulation of    
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working time 
(variables 9 to 
15) 
France 0.75***  -0.2*** -0.02 0.97 1.87 AR (2) 
Germany1 0.68*** -0.19***  0.04 0.94 1.76 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.25***  0.01 0.64 1.97 AR (2) 
   Regulation of 
dismissal 
(variables 16 to 
24) 
   
France 0.71** -0.19***  0.02 0.97 1.94 AR (2) 
Germany1 0.73*** -0.19*** -0.05 0.94 1.74 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.24*** -0.01 0.64 1.96 AR (2) 
USA2 0.69*** -0.14*** -0.04 0.65 1.73 AR (1) 
   Employee 
representation 
(variables 25 to 
31) 
   
France 0.73*** -0.2*** -0.004 0.97 1.87 AR (2) 
Germany1 0.57*** -0.23***  0.19 0.94 1.72 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.24*** -0.01 0.64 1.94 AR (2) 
   Industrial action 
(variables 32 to 
40) 
   
France 0.64*** -0.21*** 0.11 0.97 1.88 AR (2`) 
Germany1 0.62*** -0.21*** 0.21 0.94 1.73 AR (2) 
UK 0.69*** -0.24*** 0.003 0.64 1.96 AR (2) 
 
***  Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
**  Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
* Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
♥ The fitted equation is  
 Y= a + b. DLRGDP + c.LR                                          (1) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, the growth rate of civil employment,  DLN or the 
growth of labour productivity (LBPRD) or the wage share in total economy (WGSH),  
DLRGDP is the growth rate of real GDP (RGDP), LR is the labour regulation index 
(aggregate or its different components taken one at a time),  a, b and c are regression 
parameters.   This equation is fitted on the ordinary least squares (OLS) basis and a 
twelve order Lagrange Multiplier Test is conducted to ascertain the order of 
autocorrelation of the residuals.  To tackle the problem of autocorrelation (if any), the 
Exact Newton-Raphson Iterative Method was used to estimate the parameters. The choice 
between AR (1) and  AR (2) is done on the basis of  the log-likelihood ratio tests of 
AR(1) versus  OLS and AR(2) versus AR(1).  
Notes:  




1 The period of study starts from 1972 (due to lack of data). 
2 The period of study ends at 2005 (due to lack of data). 
 
Sources: CBR Labour Regulation Dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm); OECD 
(OECD’s iLibrary); International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics 2008. 
 
Data on civil employment are available from the OECD (the OECD 
iLibrary) and data on real GDP are available from the IMF (International 
Financial Statistics). To avoid the problem of non-stationarity5 we take the 
first log-difference of the two series; these give us the annual growth rates 
of employment and real output (respectively) over the period 1971-2006. 
We then fit the following regression, with a time trend: 
 
DLN = a + b.DLRDGP + c.LR                                          (1) 
 
DLN is the growth rate of employment, DLRDGP is the growth rate of 
real GDP (RGDP), LR is labour regulation index (aggregate or its 
different components taken one at a time), and a, b and c are regression 
parameters.  
 
Our analysis shows, as we would expect, that the growth rates of real 
output and employment are positively related in all the countries. The 
aggregate labour regulation index, however, has no significant relationship 
(positive or negative) with employment growth in France, Germany6 and 
the UK, after controlling for the macroeconomic environment as 
represented by the trend in the growth of real GDP. This is also true for 
the different components of the labour regulation index. There is one 
exception – the trend in French labour law on working time is positively 
                                                 
5  Macroeconomic series are often found to be non-stationary at various levels, 
with or without time-trends (Nelson and Plosser, 1992). If due adjustments (first 
or higher order differencing) are not made to make these series stationary, the 
problem of spurious regressions may arise. The first (log)-differencing of the 
macroeconomic series carried out here makes them stationary (details of these 
technicalities are omitted for the sake of brevity).   
6  German employment growth shows one outlier in 1991.  We used a spike 
dummy (=1 for 1991 and 0 otherwise) and re-ran the regression.  Our findings 
were unaffected. 
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related to employment growth. The USA is the only country where we 
find an inverse relationship between labour regulation and employment 
growth. This is because of the changes in the regulation of dismissal (the 
aggregate of variables 16 to 24) – the only area in which there was a 
significant change in US law over the period.7  This refers to the 
introduction of the federal WARN law of 1988 (and effective from 1989) 
mandating minimum notice periods and severance pay in the event of 
economic dismissals.8   
 
Next we examine whether labour law changes have an impact on labour 
productivity. We have data on annual growth rate of labour productivity 
per unit of labour input (LBPRD) for the four countries for the period 
1971-2005/2006. Replicating our regression analysis by replacing DLN by 
LBPRD in Equation 1, we can observe that the growth of real output and 
labour productivity growth are directly related.  There is, however, no 
significant relationship between the productivity growth rate and trends in 
the labour regulation indices for the two of the four countries, France and 
UK (irrespective of the inclusion of the real growth rate in the regression).  
For Germany, the indices concerning working time and dismissal are 
                                                 
7  These findings hold good even if we do not adjust for macroeconomic 
fluctuations by setting b = 0 (that is, ignoring the real GDP growth rate) in the 
regression equation.  Our findings on labour law and employment growth are also 
robust to this revised regression analysis, with one exception: the positive 
relationship between employment growth and working time regulation in France 
cannot be maintained when this revised regression is fitted. 
8  The employment growth rate in the USA fell sharply between 1989 and 1991, 
at a point when the growth rate of GDP was also falling and there was a (short) 
recession.  We observe the inverse relationship referred to in the text after 
controlling for the rate of growth of GDP.  After 1992 US employment growth 
resumed but for the most of the 1990s the rate of growth was lower than it was in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  It is unlikely, in principle, that this long-run trend can be 
ascribed solely to the WARN law, given the relatively limited nature of that 
legislation and the high possibility that it simply crystallised a pre-existing 
practice of voluntary notice and severance (see Addison and Blackburn, 1994).  
As we suggest in the text below (section 3.4), in the context of a long time series 
such as this, very great caution should be exercised in extrapolating from a single 
legal reform.  However, the result is at least suggestive, and highlights the 
potential importance of this question, which could be explored more deeply in 
future research by the addition of further controls and by sector-specific analyses. 




positively correlated with labour productivity growth at a very high level 
of statistical significance (provided we take into account the real growth 
rate).  On the whole, there is somewhat weak evidence (significant at the 
10 per cent level) of a positive relationship between the US labour 
regulation index and labour productivity growth which is associated with 
the change in the regulation of dismissal brought about by the WARN law 
after 1989. 
 
Next we examine whether labour regulations affect income distribution.  
We use the share of wages in the total economy, for which time series 
exist for the period and countries in question, as a proxy for the 
redistributive effect of labour law.  The wage share showed a declining 
trend in all the countries throughout the period; in France and Germany 
there were rising trends in the 1970s and declining trends thereafter while 
the UK experienced a mild declining trend amid cyclical fluctuations.  In 
Equation 1 we replace DLN by a wage share variable (WGSH). In all the 
four countries the wage share and real growth rate are inversely related – 
the higher the real growth rate, the lower is the wage share. However, 
there is no significant relationship between labour regulation and the wage 
share.9  Thus labour law changes (which have mainly had the effect of 
strengthening of protection for workers, with the exception of the British 
case from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s) cannot be held responsible for 
labour’s declining share of national income over this period in each of the 
countries in our sample. 
   
Finally we look at the issue of complementarities across forms of 
regulation.  We can see from the correlation matrix set out in Table 3 that 
the level of labour regulation is positively correlated with that of 
shareholder and creditor protection in both France and Germany.  The 
same is true, but to a lesser extent, in the United States.  In other words, in 
these systems, there are complementarities between the prevailing modes 
of regulation of labour relations and corporate governance.  In France and 
Germany, for example, a high level of protection for workers has not 
proved incompatible with greater shareholder protection: the score for 
shareholder rights has been rising in these two countries across the whole 
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period (Lele and Siems, 2007).  In the UK, the situation is reversed: there 
is an negative relationship between the level of labour law regulation and 
the protection accorded to shareholders and creditors, (although it is not 
statistically significant).  In the US case, there is a weak but significant 
correlation between the trends in regulation across the three areas of law.   
This is a finding which requires some explanation, in the sense that it is 
perhaps surprising that the inverse relationship between labour law and 
company law that we find for the UK is not replicated for the US.  The 
explanation lies in the relatively low score given to US shareholder 
protection law.   For reasons explored in more detail elsewhere (see Lele 
and Siems, 2007), US law is less protective of shareholder rights than is 
conventionally believed; however, dispersed ownership and a high degree 
of liquidity in capital markets might well be explained by factors not 
accounted for in the shareholder protection index, in particular the 
intensive nature of securities market regulation in the US context and the 
substantial resources devoted to enforcement through the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (see Jackson and Roe, 2007).  On this basis, a 
more complete picture of the regulatory framework in the US would 
probably be consistent with the view that there is an inverse relationship 




Correlations between labour regulation, shareholder protection and creditor 
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1.0   
Shareholder Protection 
Index 
0.38* 1.0  
Creditor Rights 
Index 
0.88* 0.4* 1.0 
 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Source: CBR Datasets on Labour Regulation, Shareholder Protection and 
Creditor Rights (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; Lele and Siems, 2007; Armour, 
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D. INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE 
 
Table 4 summarises the results which have just been set out.  The only 
negative relationship is that between dismissal regulation and employment 
growth in the US; but there is a countervailing increase here in labour 
productivity.  It is difficult to draw strong conclusions either way from the 
US case because there were very few changes of any kind in the law 
during the period being reviewed.  While the time-series analysis we have 
conducted is well suited to analyzing the consequences of change, it is less 
effective in contexts where the variables being studied are stable over 
time.  The US result is driven by just one change in the law, the 
introduction of minimum notice and severance pay rules in the WARN 
legislation.  Therefore it would be reasonable to regard it is as somewhat 




Summary of Main Findings  
 
 
Legal variable Outcome 
variable 
Country Relationship 










United States _ 
 Productivity United States + 
 Productivity Germany + 
 
 
                                                 
10  Recent work on the impact of derogations from the employment at will rule in 
several US states in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that the effects of changes to 
employment law may be highly complex in the American context: it reports a 
link between the tightening of legal controls over dismissal and an increase in 
employment growth, a rise in labour productivity, but a fall in total factor 
productivity in the manufacturing sector (Autor et al., 2007).   




The regulation of working time is positively correlated with productivity 
levels in France and Germany, and the regulation of dismissal is positively 
correlated with productivity levels in Germany; in neither case is there 
evidence of offsetting reductions in employment.  These findings imply 
that labour regulation of this kind may have beneficial impacts when 
combined with other institutions in the context of coordinated market 
economies. The precise nature of these complementarities cannot be 
observed in the data we have examined here, but could be studied in future 
work. 
 
The labour law indicator with the strongest relationship to the economic 
variables is the regulation of dismissal, which has a positive effect on 
productivity in two of the four countries studied.  Working time regulation 
is also shown to have a relationship to employment growth and 
productivity in some contexts.  Employee representation law and the 
regulation of the right to strike do not appear to be correlated with either 
employment or productivity.   
 
We therefore have evidence that labour law change has had a positive 
relationship to employment growth and to increases in productivity in 
certain countries and in particular policy contexts.  This relationship is by 
no means uniform across the countries in the sample, and, indeed, there 
are some contexts in which we find no link at all, either positive or 
negative, between increasing regulation and economic outcomes.  This 
varied picture is what the indeterminacy hypothesis would predict.  
Because labour laws most often codify and extend existing practices, 
rather than imposing entirely novel rules on a previously regulated labour 
market, we would not necessarily expect the consequences of legal change 
to be substantial in every case.  It is also possible that the parties to 
employment contracts can adjust to new legislation in ways which reduces 
any negative (or positive) economic consequences (Freeman, 2005).  But 
we can also see that labour law is not trivial: we report statistically 
significant relationships between labour law trends and economic impacts 
in certain contexts.  These findings offer support to the complementarity 
hypothesis, in so far as they suggest that some aspects of labour law 
regulation, in particular laws on working time and dismissal, are most 
likely to have the positive economic impacts predicted for them in 
coordinated market systems, such as France and Germany.  Our results are 
consistent with those of Gatti (2008) on the existence of 
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complementarities between employment protection legislation and 
ownership concentration in coordinated market systems, although we 
cannot observe the effects of ownership concentration directly in our 
dataset.  Our findings qualify or at least complicate the complementarity 
hypothesis in one respect: if we look solely at developments in legal rules, 
we can see that in France and Germany, there has been a high level of 
labour law regulation but also an increase in shareholder protection over 
the period in question.  It is beyond the scope of the present study to 
consider how far this change in the law governing shareholder rights might 
have led to a shift in the prevailing pattern of share ownership in these 
countries.  This is a matter for future research.  In Britain, by contrast, 
there is evidence of an inverse relationship between the trend in labour law 
and those in company and insolvency law.  This is what we would expect 
from a comparative political economy perspective – strong shareholder 
protection is complementary to weak labour law.  In the American case 
there is no such negative relationship, but nor is the degree of correlation 
between the different areas of regulation as strong as it is in France and 
Germany.  Some possible explanations for the surprising US result have 




This paper has offered a reassessment of the long-run economic impact of 
labour laws.  We suggested, firstly, that a theoretical reappraisal of the role 
of the law in shaping economic outcomes was needed.  In most economic 
models, labour laws are seen as an exogenous interference with market 
relations.  We argued, drawing on recent developments in legal origins 
theory and in comparative political economy, that this standard approach 
is potentially misleading.  This is, firstly, because labour laws are to, a 
certain degree, endogenous to the economic and political environments in 
which they operate.  Formalised labour regulations generalize and extend 
pre-existing social practices which can be understood as evolved responses 
to coordination failures in labour markets; in addition, they are shaped to 
varying degrees by interest-group configurations, macroeconomic 
conditions, and long-run legal and political structures.  To say that labour 
law is shaped by elements in its economic environment as well as by 
political and legal-institutional factors is not to imply a perfect fit; 




however, it may well be equally mistaken to assume that labour laws 
always impose exogenous costs on firms.   Secondly, and relatedly, labour 
regulation is pluralistic: labour laws take effect not in isolation but through 
and alongside self-regulation on the part of market actors and social 
norms.  An understanding of the economic impact of the formal law 
should take into account the mediating role of these other institutions.   
Thirdly, labour laws are systemic, that is to say, they operate in 
conjunction with other, complementary institutions in market economies.  
It is necessary to pay regard to these potential interactions when predicting 
the effects of a change in the law.   
 
The implications of viewing labour law in the ways just suggested are far-
reaching.  The effects of labour law may be more indeterminate than 
previously thought, in the sense of being highly context-dependent (the 
‘indeterminacy hypothesis’).  More specifically, labour law rules may be 
expected to have efficiency-enhancing effects in situations where they 
operate in conjunction with other institutional phenomena (the 
‘complementarity hypothesis’).  The perspective we have suggested also 
opens up new insights on the claim that legal infrastructure may influence 
both the content of labour law and its impact in terms of efficiency (the 
‘legal origins hypothesis’). 
 
A theoretical reappraisal of this kind points up the need for a better 
empirical understanding of the way legal systems operate in economic 
contexts such as that of the labour market.  One aspect of this is the 
development of reliable measures of legal regulation which capture change 
in the content of rules over time.  In this paper we have discussed 
methodological issues involved in the coding of labour laws and presented 
evidence from a new, longitudinal index of changes in labour law 
regulation in France, Germany, the UK and the US from the early 1970s to 
the present day.  Analysis of the dataset offers some support for the weak-
form legal origin hypothesis, which claims that legal infrastructure has an 
effect on the content of the law.  However, the strong-form legal origin 
claim, that common law systems are more likely to produce efficiency-
enhancing rules than civil law ones, is not supported.  Instead, there is 
evidence to suggest that the economic effects of labour laws are not just 
highly varied and complex, a result which is compatible with the 
indeterminacy hypothesis, but also that they may be efficiency-enhancing 
in certain contexts and in particular in civil law systems, a conclusion 
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which is consistent with the complementarity hypothesis.  Over the period 
studied, the strengthening of dismissal laws had positive effects on 
employment and productivity growth in France and Germany, and tighter 
working time laws had a positive impact on employment growth in 
France, after controlling for the macroeconomic environment as measured 
by the growth in real GDP.  A slight strengthening of dismissal controls 
had a negative impact on employment growth but a positive effect on 
productivity growth in the US.  While these results must, in some respects, 
be seen as tentative, they suggest that time-series analyses can cast new 
light on the empirical effects of labour laws, while also confirming the 
need for a more nuanced theoretical understanding of this issue. 
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C. Regulation of dismissal    
16. Legally mandated notice period (all 
dismissals) 
Measures the length of notice, in 
weeks, that has to be given to a worker 
with 3 years’ employment.  Normalise 
the score so that 0 weeks = 0 and 12 




A 2-week norm was in effect between 1970 and 1975 
(Contracts of Employment Act 1963); from 1975 
(Employment Protection Act 1975) the period was 3 
weeks. 
 
17. Legally mandated redundancy 
compensation 
Measures the amount of redundancy 
compensation payable to a worker 
made redundant after 3 years of 
employment, measured in weeks of 
pay.  Normalise the score so that 0 
weeks = 0 and 12 weeks = 1. 
1970-: 0.25 The normal rule throughout this period (Redundancy 
Payments Act 1965 and successor statutes) is that 
redundancy payments were calculated on the basis of 1 
week’s employment for each year worked between the 
ages of 22 and 41 (1.5 week for years over age of 41, and 
0.5 weeks for years worked between 18 and 22).  This is 
subject to a statutory ceiling. 
 
18. Minimum qualifying period of 
service for normal case of unjust 
dismissal 
Measures the period of service 
required before a worker qualifies for 
general protection against unjust 





The qualifying period for general unfair dismissal 
protection was two years between 1972 and 1974 
(Industrial Relations Act 1971); one year from 1974 to 
1975 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974); six 
  
 














months between 1975 and 1979 (Employment Protection 
Act 1975); one year between 1979 and 1985 (‘July 
orders’, 1979); two years between 1985 and 1999 (SI 
1985); and one year again from 1999 (Employment 
Relations Act 1999). 
19. Law imposes procedural 
constraints on dismissal 
Equals 1 if a dismissal is necessarily 
unjust if the employer fails to follow 








The general rule of UK unfair dismissal law is that a 
dismissal is likely to be unfair if the employer fails to 
adhere to procedural standards but is not inevitably so.  
Up to 1987 the employer could avoid a finding of unfair 




Equals 0.67 if failure to follow 
procedural requirements will normally 
lead to a finding of unjust dismissal.   
 
Equals 0.33 if failure to follow 
procedural requirement is just one 
factor taken into account in unjust 
dismissal cases. 
 
Equals 0 if there are no procedural 
requirements for dismissal.   
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 







have made no difference to the outcome because the 
dismissal was substantively fair.  In 1987 that rule was 
reversed by decision of the House of Lords (Polkey v. 
A.E. Dayton  Services Ltd.).  With effect from 2004 the 
Polkey decision was reversed by statute (Employment 
Act 2002) but only if the employer could show that it had 
complied with a minimal obligation to hold a hearing 
prior to dismissal.  This latter requirement is substantially 
below the threshold of procedural fairness which 
generally applies to unfair dismissal law. 
20. Law imposes substantive 
constraints on dismissal 
Equals 1 if dismissal is only 
permissible for serious misconduct or 




UK unfair dismissal law (now contained in Employment 
Rights Act 1996) sets out a range of ‘potentially fair’ 




Equals 0.67 if dismissal is lawful 
according to a wider range of 
legitimate reasons (misconduct, lack of 
capability, redundancy, etc.).   
 
Equals 0.33 if dismissal is permissible 
if it is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ as defined by case 
law. 
 
Equals 0 if employment is at will (i.e., 
no cause dismissal is normally 
permissible). 
 
Scope for gradations between 0 and 1 
to reflect changes in the strength of the 
law. 
 
misconduct, lack of qualifications, redundancy, statutory 
bar, and a residual category (some other substantial 
reason of a kind to justify the dismissal).  The existence 
of the residual category is important in diluting the 
protection of employees, suggesting a coding between the 




21. Reinstatement normal remedy for 
unfair dismissal 
Equals 1 if reinstatement is the normal 
remedy for unjust dismissal and is 
regularly enforced. 
 
Equals 0.67 if reinstatement and 
compensation are, de iure and de facto, 
alternative remedies. 
 
Equals 0.33 if compensation is the 
normal remedy. 
 
Equals 0 if no remedy is available as of 
right. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 




Reinstatement is stated to be the ‘principal’ remedy for 
unfair dismissal (Employment Rights Act 1996) but this 
rule is qualified by many significant restrictions on the 
powers of tribunals to award reinstatement.  In practice 
reinstatement is very rarely awarded.  There are also only 
very limited powers to order the interim reinstatement of 
an applicant pending the full hearing of the claim. 
22. Notification of dismissal Equals 1 if by law or binding collective 1970-1971: 0 The normal rule since the inception of the unfair 
  
 
agreement the employer has to obtain 
the permission of a state body or third 
body prior to an individual dismissal. 
 
Equals 0.67 if a state body or third 
party has to be notified prior to the 
dismissal. 
 
Equals 0.33 if the employer has to give 
the worker written reasons for the 
dismissal.  
 
Equals 0 if an oral statement of 
dismissal to the worker suffices. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 
of the law. 
 
1972-: 0.33 
dismissal jurisdiction in 1971 (see now Employment 
Rights Act 1996) is that the employee must be given 




23. Redundancy selection  Equals 1 if by law or binding collective 
agreement the employer must follow 
priority rules based on seniority, 
marital status, number or dependants, 
etc., prior to dismissing for 
redundancy. 
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Scope for further gradations between 0 
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 





Dismissal in breach of a ‘customary’ selection procedure 
such as ‘last in, first out’ was automatically unfair 
between 1975 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
1974) and 1989 (Employment Act 1989).  After 1989, the 
employer continued to be under a duty, under general 
unfair dismissal law, to have regard to priority rules 
governing selection for redundancy. 
 
 
24. Priority in re-employment Equals 1 if by law or binding collective 
agreement the employer must follow 
priority rules relating to the re-
employment of former workers.   
 
Equals 0 otherwise. 





Scope for further gradations between 0 
and 1 to reflect changes in the strength 
of the law. 
C. Regulation of dismissal Measures the regulation of dismssal, 




Source: CBR Labour Regulation Dataset (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm). 
 
 
